OpenSSL::OCSP

OpenSSL::OCSP implements Online Certificate Status Protocol requests and responses.

Creating and sending an OCSP request requires a subject certificate that contains an OCSP URL in an authorityInfoAccess extension and the issuer certificate for the subject certificate. First, load the issuer and subject certificates:

subject = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new subject_pem
issuer  = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new issuer_pem

To create the request we need to create a certificate ID for the subject certificate so the CA knows which certificate we are asking about:

digest = OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new
certificate_id =
  OpenSSL::OCSP::CertificateId.new subject, issuer, digest

Then create a request and add the certificate ID to it:

request = OpenSSL::OCSP::Request.new
request.add_certid certificate_id

Adding a nonce to the request protects against replay attacks but not all CA process the nonce.

request.add_nonce

To submit the request to the CA for verification we need to extract the OCSP URI from the subject certificate:

ocsp_uris = subject.ocsp_uris

require 'uri'

ocsp_uri = URI ocsp_uris[0]

To submit the request we’ll POST the request to the OCSP URI (per RFC 2560). Note that we only handle HTTP requests and don’t handle any redirects in this example, so this is insufficient for serious use.

require 'net/http'

http_response =
  Net::HTTP.start ocsp_uri.hostname, ocsp.port do |http|
    http.post ocsp_uri.path, request.to_der,
              'content-type' => 'application/ocsp-request'
end

response = OpenSSL::OCSP::Response.new http_response.body
response_basic = response.basic

First we check if the response has a valid signature. Without a valid signature we cannot trust it. If you get a failure here you may be missing a system certificate store or may be missing the intermediate certificates.

store = OpenSSL::X509::Store.new
store.set_default_paths

unless response_basic.verify [], store then
  raise 'response is not signed by a trusted certificate'
end

The response contains the status information (success/fail). We can display the status as a string:

puts response.status_string #=> successful

Next we need to know the response details to determine if the response matches our request. First we check the nonce. Again, not all CAs support a nonce. See OpenSSL::OCSP::Request#check_nonce for the meanings of the return values.

p request.check_nonce basic_response #=> value from -1 to 3

Then extract the status information for the certificate from the basic response.

single_response = basic_response.find_response(certificate_id)

unless single_response
  raise 'basic_response does not have the status for the certificiate'
end

Then check the validity. A status issued in the future must be rejected.

unless single_response.check_validity
  raise 'this_update is in the future or next_update time has passed'
end

case single_response.cert_status
when OpenSSL::OCSP::V_CERTSTATUS_GOOD
  puts 'certificate is still valid'
when OpenSSL::OCSP::V_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED
  puts "certificate has been revoked at #{single_response.revocation_time}"
when OpenSSL::OCSP::V_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN
  puts 'responder doesn't know about the certificate'
end

Constants

NOCASIGN: (This flag is not used by OpenSSL 1.0.1g)
NOCERTS: Do not include certificates in the response
NOCHAIN: Do not verify the certificate chain on the response
NOCHECKS: Do not make additional signing certificate checks
NODELEGATED: (This flag is not used by OpenSSL 1.0.1g)
NOEXPLICIT: Do not check trust
NOINTERN: Do not search certificates contained in the response for a signer
NOSIGS: Do not check the signature on the response
NOTIME: Do not include producedAt time in response
NOVERIFY: Do not verify the response at all
RESPID_KEY: Identify the response by signing the certificate key ID
RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR: Internal error in issuer
RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST: Illegal confirmation request
RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED: You must sign the request and resubmit
RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL: Response has valid confirmations
RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER: Try again later
RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED: Your request is unauthorized.
REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED: The certificate subject’s name or other information changed
REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE: This CA certificate was revoked due to a key compromise
REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD: The certificate is on hold
REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION: The certificate is no longer needed
REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE: The certificate was revoked due to a key compromise
REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS: The certificate was revoked for an unknown reason
REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL: The certificate was previously on hold and should now be removed from the CRL
REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED: The certificate was superseded by a new certificate
REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED: The certificate was revoked for an unspecified reason
TRUSTOTHER: Do not verify additional certificates
V_CERTSTATUS_GOOD: Indicates the certificate is not revoked but does not necessarily mean the certificate was issued or that this response is within the certificate’s validity interval
V_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED: Indicates the certificate has been revoked either permanently or temporarily (on hold).
V_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN: Indicates the responder does not know about the certificate being requested.
V_RESPID_KEY: The responder ID is based on the public key.
V_RESPID_NAME: The responder ID is based on the key name.